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I INTRODUCTION
Why are the ambitions of economic development
and reform so often disappointed, especially in low-
income countries? One possible answer is that con-
ventional reform strategies are seriously wrong.
Most economists, probably, would not subscribe to
such a verdict. A fairly broad consensus has emerged
that there is no way but to adopt prudent macro-
economic policies, implement outward-oriented
strategies, and remove distortions in goods and fac-
tor markets) Another answer is, thus, that good
plans are not implemented properly. Frequently,
economic recommendations fall on institutionally
barren ground (Borner, Brunetti and Weder 1993)
and reforms are stalled because of internal bottle-
necks in terms of governance. In other words, West-
ern advisers and donors have neglected the political
economy of decision making in low-income coun-
tries, while overtaxing the existing texture of their
societies (Hiemenz 1989: 24).
Past failures suggest that development economists
have to offer more than 'price mechanists' (Lal 1983:
107) typically have done. This is not to deny that
their principal message of getting the prices right,
according to which market forces should be relied
upon as far as possible, is still relevant. However, in
order for markets to work efficiently in low-income
countries, the institutional and political framework
must no longer be ignored (see also Williamson
1994). Consequently, the recent discussion on
development cooperation has centred around
institution building and good governance.
It is quite easy to agree on the importance of adequate
institutions and good governance in principle, but,
typically, the exact meaning of these terms and the
role of external donors in this area are not precisely
defined. A rather confusing variety of catchwords
is mentioned: property rights, participatory devel-
opment, rule of law, administrative capacity build-
ing, and investment in human capital are only a few
among them. For example, the World Bank (1994a:
For a detailed presentation of widely agreed reform elements of
the so-called Washington consensus, see Williamson (1990).
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2) concludes from a recent assessment of economic
adjustment programmes in sub-Saharan Africa: 'Ad-
justment alone will not put countries on a sustained,
poverty-reducing growth path. That is the challenge
of long-term development, which requires better
economic policies and more investment in human
capital, infrastructure, and institution-building,
along with better governance'.
It is clearly beyond the scope of this short paper
to clarify the confusion prevailing in the present
discussion. In what follows the focus is on donor
perspectives with regard to revising and extending
bilateral aid policies. Section 2 summarizes and
critically discusses one of the potentially influential
documents, i.e. the recent OECD publication on
orientations of the Development Assistance Com-
mittee (DAC) on participatory development and good
governance (OECD 1994).2 These orientations were
endorsed by the DAC at its High Level Meeting in
December 1993 and may indicate the donors' future
stance in bilateral development cooperation. Subse-
quently, we will argue that only limited means are
available to achieve the impressive - though not
always consistent - list of heroic ends (Section 3).
What is feasible largely resembles earlier sugges-
tions for reforming traditional aid policies. In
Section 4, it will be discussed whether a bottom-up
approach with respect to participatory develop-
ment offers a promising alternative to the top-down
approach applied by public international aid
agencies. Section 5 concludes that changing donor
perspectives will have little impact unless aid re-
cipients are ready to tackle the fundamental bottle-
necks hampering economic and social development
in their own realm.
2 HEROIC DONOR PERSPECTIVES
The OECD document on participation and govern-
ance (OECD 1994) presents a most impressive
agenda for achieving sustained economic and
social development in Third World economies. It
1 For the World Bank's perceptions and experience, see World
Bank (1992; 1994b).
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addresses a fairly wide range of issues and identifies
a number of close to loo policy measures, part of
which are broadly defined while others are highly
specific. The document covers five topics and,
thereby, applies a most comprehensive definition of
sociopolitical conditions for development. The top-
ics are: (i) participatory development, (ii) democra-
tization, (iii) good governance including the rule of
law, public sector management, controlling corrup-
tion and reducing military expenditure, (iv) human
rights, and (y) coherence and coordination of donor
policies.
Participatory development or popular participa-
tion is defined as a process by which people take
an active and influential hand in shaping decisions
that affect their lives. Empowering groups, commu-
nities, and organizations to negotiate with political
institutions and bureaucracies is considered essen-
tial for influencing public policy, providing a check
on government discretion, as well as enhancing the
effectiveness and sustainability of development
programmes. The request for popular participation
ranges from the grassroots level to the political life
of the country. Participatory development is linked
to equity goals of external aid policies. Priority is
attached to programmes providing effective serv-
ices for education, training, and health for the
population, with equal access for women. Practi-
cally, donors are requested:
to support grassroots organizations and inter-
mediary organizations such as professional asso-
ciations, consumer groups, and trade unions;
to involve all project stakeholders in programme
design and implementation, and
to provide support for decentralization pro-
grammes.
Most development economists will probably agree
that human resource development is a precondition
for popular participation. They have argued for
years that external aid should be focused on basic
education, training and health services. However,
the aforementioned areas for DAC action involve
several problems which cannot simply be ignored.
For example, the experience of NGOs suggests
that popular participation in aid programmes is
See also Moore and Robinson (1994). Haggard and Kaufman
(1989: 233) argue that democratic and authoritarian categories are
too broad to be of analytic use. Specifically, there is 'no systematic
frequently resisted by Third World governments
as it may undermine the power base of the ruling
élites. So far it is completely open to question
whether and in which way donor governments can
overcome the widespread resistance to participa-
tory development. Furthermore, it appears to be
somewhat naive to assume that more participation
and decentralization will automatically result in
greater efficiency of aid projects. Exactly the
opposite may happen if the conflicting demands
of various groups and institutions have to be
identified and coordinated in a time-consuming
negotiation process.
The second topic, i.e. democratization, 'integrates
participation into the political life of the country'
(OECD 1994: 12). Democratic principles revolve
around the keywords consent, legitimacy of the
government and accountability to the people.
Periodic free and fair elections are considered to be
an essential feature of functioning democracies.
Democratization requires 'the development of a
pluralist civil society comprised of a range of insti-
tutions and associations which represent diverse
interests and provide a counterweight to govern-
ment' (ibid.). Hence, the OECD document calls for
donors supporting pluralism and better access to
information, as well as helping improve the func-
tioning of representative political institutions,
electoral processes and consultative mechanisms.
Donors consider democratization to be of intrinsic
value. In addition, they are tempted to sell the idea
that political and economic progress are closely
associated. The empirical foundations of this rea-
soning are weak, however.3 The ambiguities are
particularly pronounced when it comes to the
question of causation. Sometimes, e.g. in the case
of China, it is argued that the public demand for
democratization will rise only after economic
progress has been achieved. If so, economic devel-
opment would be a major determinant of political
liberalization. The available evidence at least
provides little justification to assume causation
running from democratization to better economic
performance. The best performers among the de-
veloping countries are located in Southeast Asia,
and most governments in this region have little
reputation with respect to early moves towards
Western style democracy.
associationbetween either democracy or dictatorship and the ability
to stabilize'.
By contrast, many Asian governments stand out in
terms of their determination 'to use ... political au-
thority and exercise ... control in a society in relation
to the management of its resources for social and
economic development' (OECD 1994: 14), which
appears to be a widely used definition of good
governance. This implies that DAC orientations on
participation and democratization on the one hand,
and governance on the other hand may involve
serious conflicts and trade-offs.
A closer look at the elements that the DAC consid-
ers to be part of good governance reveals that even
the best performers in Asia would not pass the test.
This is primarily because controlling corruption is
one of the dimensions of good governance accord-
ing to the OECD document. Another one concerns
the request for reducing military expenditure if it
is 'excessive' so that development needs are sacri-
ficed. Not surprisingly, however, donor perceptions
are rather vague on how to improve governance in
these respects. The problem of corruption shall
be tackled by exposing corrupt practices, e.g. in
the media, and reducing the opportunities for
corruption, e.g. through greater reliance on trans-
parent and competitive bidding processes in public
procurement and on auctions in foreign exchange
allocation. The difficulties in reducing military
expenditure start with defining what is excessive
in a particular case. Moreover, if donors cease to
provide aid which may have helped sustaining
excessive military spending, it is open to question
whether the military or the population will be the
first to suffer from such a move. Most impor-
tantly, Western aid administrations face tremen-
dous credibility problems in campaigning against
military spending as long as other government de-
partments in donor countries are deeply involved in
promoting arms exports to developing countries
(Moore and Robinson 1994: 148).
More concrete suggestions are made with respect
to the two remaining dimensions of good govern-
ance, i.e. the rule of law and efficient public sector
management. lt is beyond serious doubt that ineffi-
ciencies in the legal system increase business costs,
discourage investors and obstruct economic devel-
opment. Such inefficiencies include the lack of
predictability in the legal environment, the lack of
an independent court system, delays in handling
legal conflicts and insufficient enforcement of court
decisions. A wide range of technical assistance by
external donors may help to strengthen the rule of
law. Donor support may relate to the dissemination
of legal information, 'legal literacy' programmes,
the design of appropriate and enforceable legal
provisions for property rights, trade and invest-
ment, as well as training the legal staff.
Public sector reform is frequently required for two
related reasons. On the one hand, many govern-
ments are tempted to extend their activities far
beyond their role in providing public goods.
Streamlining and reducing the size of public sector
institutions is particularly important where 'gov-
ernment market intervention ... (is) bordering on
state economic management' (Hiemenz 1989: 6).
On the other hand, overcharged governments
typically fail to fulfil their key tasks, among which
the establishment of a predictable, coherent and
transparent framework of basic rules and regula-
tions guiding private economic activities figures
prominently. Put differently, good governance calls
for strong, though small governments. For exam-
ple, governments must be strong enough to resist
well organized pressure groups. Obviously, this
may involve conflicts with greater participation
in public decision making. While such internal
inconsistencies are largely ignored in the OECD
document, the DAC agenda offers detailed sugges-
tions to strengthen the competence of governments
and public administrations in formulating and
implementing appropriate policies. The long list of
areas for action comprises:
improved accounting by training the relevant
staff and modernizing accounting and auditing
procedures;
improved budgeting and expenditure manage-
ment, e.g. through efficient information systems,
effective tax and customs administration, and
technical support granted to finance ministries and
central banks;
civil service reform, which requires reliable data
on employees, ghost employees, and payrolls in the
first place, and may then proceed to appropriate
adjustment measures.
As concerns human rights, a substantial body of
international laws and agreements such as the 1993
Vienna Declaration can be referred to. DAC mem-
bers expect developing country governments 'to
share a common commitment to securing the
human rights of all human beings, regardless of
gender, ethnic identity, religion, race or socio-
economic status' (OECD 1994: 22). In contrast to aid
recipients, the human rights definition of external
donors focuses on civil and political liberties, rather
than socio-economic rights (Moore and Robinson
1994). However, the DAC acknowledges that extreme
poverty has to be reduced by coordinated efforts of
both donors and recipients of aid, since poverty is
frequently linked with violations of civil rights, e.g.
the widespread discrimination against women.
The donors' inclination to consider the human rights
situation in recipient countries when deciding on
the allocation of aid has grown since the end of
the Cold War, during which politically motivated
compromises were all abroad. Nevertheless, the
credibility of donor governments continues to be
seriously deficient. The critical question is about the
donors' reaction if the policy dialogue with aid
recipients, which is the approach favoured by do-
nor governments, fails in protecting and promoting
human rights. First indications are that donors will
not apply the same criteria across all recipients
when a reduction or suspension of aid is called for
due to persistent violations of human rights. The
recent termination of sanctions against China sug-
gests that human rights are sacrificed sooner or
later once significant export interests of industrial
countries are at stake. It can safely be assumed that
tougher standards will be applied in dealing with
countries with small and stagnant markets.
As is evident from the previous discussion, the
DAC orientations on participation and governance
necessitate coherence and coordination of donor
policies. As a matter of fact, the OECD document
addresses this issue in a short section. However, a
list of specific areas for action is missing, which
is in striking contrast to all other sections of the
document. The DAC appeal to improve policy
coherence within donor governments 'by promot-
ing horizontal approaches to the issues encompassed
in participatory development and good governance
in developing countries' (OECD 1994: 25) will
probably have little impact as aid ministries and
agencies typically rank low in the power structure
of donor governments. Furthermore, coordination
of donor policies at the DAC level will prove
difficult. For example, the US approach towards
democratization in developing countries, with its
vigorous insistence on formal electoral processes, is
significantly different from the European approach
(for details, see Moore and Robinson 1994: 147).
3 WHAT DONORS CAN ACTUALLY DO:
LIMITED MEANS AND TRADITIONAL
DILEMMAS
So far we may conclude that DAC donors have
presented an impressive list of topical issues related
to greater participation and improved governance,
There is little to quarrel about the desirability of
these aims. However, the list involves various prob-
lems which may render it rather difficult to achieve
these aims. First of all, the consistency of objectives
listed in the DAC agenda is open to debate. In other
words: it may prove impossible to improve the
socio-political conditions for development in one
specific dimension without compromising other
dimensions. The eventuality of trade-offs between
different objectives is largely ignored in the OECD
document, although the linkages between various
topical issues are ambiguous quite obviously. As
argued before, democratization does not neces-
sarily lead to better economic performance. Like-
wise, greater participation by various interest groups
in public decision making may compromise good
governance, which requires small but strong
governments.
Second, the development impact of the agenda is
likely to suffer from a lack of credibility on the part
of donors. Behavioural changes by recipient gov-
ernments cannot reasonably be expected if it is
anticipated that conflicting interests within the
donor countries will have as a result that the rules of
the game are not strictly enforced. An obvious
example of credibility defects concerns military
spending: commitments to reduce military spend-
ing are difficult, if not impossible, to enforce by
aid agencies as long as other branches of donor
governments support arms exports. Likewise, do-
nor policies are not credible if recipient countries
are treated differently, e.g. according to their
market potential for Western exports.
Third, major problems arise when it comes to the
question by which means to achieve the heroic
ends and, specifically, what donors can do in this
respect. The DAC guidelines refer to incentives and
external support on the one hand, and sanctions
and conditionality on the other hand:
'A deepened and strengthened policy dialogue
with development partners is the most important
vehicle for advancing
... (donor) concerns at the
policy level' (OECD 1994: 9).
Operationally, the focus of external assistance
is placed on local capacity building, i.e. helping
partners to develop and harness their own
expertise. Better education, especially of women,
is - rightly - emphasized as a critical prerequisite
to economic, social, and political progress.
While donors 'wish to rely to the maximum
extent on measures of positive support, ... they also
wish to be clear about the potential for negative
measures affecting the volume and form of their
aid, in areas of serious and systematic violations of
human rights and brutal reversals from democrati-
zation, or when a complete lack of good governance
renders efficient and effective aid impossible'
(ibid).
Evidently, donors have to rely on traditional con-
cepts and mechanisms of development cooperation
in dealing with the demanding issues of participa-
hon and governance. We are back to the old and
well-known dilemmas of external aid, among which
the following figure prominently: First, aid of what-
ever form and dimension will not turn the tide
unless the recipients themselves are determined to
establish the institutions and implement the policies
required for successful economic and socio-political
development. Second, conditionality imposed on
aid recipients by external donors has typically failed
to compensate for a lack of 'ownership' of economic
reform programmes by developing countries. Let-
ters of intent have frequently been signed only to get
access to the money involved; dozens of programmes
have been abandoned after the transfers had been
made. The same is likely to happen if conditionality
is extended to institutional and political conditions.
Third, donors have rarely been committed to effec-
tively sanction the breach of contractual obligations
by aid recipients. As mentioned before, the credibil-
ity of donors is particularly deficient in the case of
developing countries with promising markets.
In effect, it is little what donors can do beyond
supporting moves towards participatory develop-
ment and attempts at better governance that are
initiated from within the developing countries. This
is what has been coined premium approach in the
late 1980s already (Hiemenz 1989). According to
this concept, donors should be prepared to reward
domestic reform efforts by increasing external
support. Empirical evidence suggests that financial
Moore and Robinson (1994: 151 ff.) argue along similar lines.
support for governments undertaking reforms has
lagged behind their needs in the past. Guihati and
Nallari (1988), for example, argue that it was at least
partly due to lacking aid response, particularly by
bilateral donors, that policy reforms were aban-
doned or stagnated in several African countries
such as Malawi, Zaire, Zambia, and Uganda.4 A
reward of reform efforts will, of course, require the
specification of criteria upon which aid disburse-
ments can be based, once letters of intent are no
longer accepted as sufficient proof of reform-
mindedness. An important implication of the pre-
mium approach is the request for greater flexibility
in aid allocation among developing countries. Coun-
try managers in aid institutions should have more
discretion to increase or suspend aid flows depend-
ing on socioeconomic developments in individual
countries. Flexibility of country quotas is especially
called for at times of stagnating overall aid volumes.
Also in terms of substance, the recent discussion on
participation and governance largely boils down to
attaching new labels to rather conventional sugges-
tions for reforming aid policies. If we had to define
a common denominator of what appears to be
feasible among the DAC orientations, we might
refer to the earlier request for software orientation
of external aid (Hiemenz 1989). This means that aid
programmes should concentrate on institution
building and human resource development, rather
than hardware (such as physical infrastructure) not
related to the fundamental bottlenecks of economic
and social development in recipient countries.
Provided local governments are committed to re-
form, institution building may be supported by
external donors in various respects:
The transparency within societies and the access
to information may be improved by promoting
diversity of written and broadcasted opinion, in-
creasing the flow of relevant economic information,
as well as facilitating the establishment and articu-
lation of producer and consumer interests.
In order to define, protect and enforce property
rights, external support may be needed, e.g. for
cadastral surveys, land-registration authorities and
independent courts.
External aid may help revising accounting
systems which neglect public use aspects of the
environment, especially with respect to public health
conditions. In this way, donors can contribute
to preventing an excessive exploitation of natural
resources.
Efficient financial intermediation may be encour-
aged if donors provide more technical assistance
related to financial accounting systems, credit
procedures, branch networks of financial institu-
tions and stock exchange facilities.
Likewise, external support may foster institu-
tional development in the area of customs and tax
administration.
As institution building has an iritra-regional di-
mension, donors may encourage the cooperation
among neighbouring countries with respect to insti-
tutional development. Institution building at the
intra-regional level may comprise: improving com-
munication networks, rationalizing energy invest-
ment, strengthening ecological cooperation, joint
food security policies, and removing barriers to the
movement of goods and factors of production
(Hiemenz 1989: 18).
As concerns human resource development, the
empirical evidence on the returns to investment in
education clearly reveals that the earlier focus of aid
policies on higher education was mistaken (see e.g.
Psacharopoulos 1993). Similarly, the frequently
favoured establishment of sophisticated health care
facilities was not suited to local needs. lt is mainly
basic health care, primary education and vocational
training that have been shown to increase produc-
tivity. External aid could involve the development
of adequate curricula, the training of teachers and
the supply of teaching equipment, as well as the
improvement of hygienical conditions. NGOs may
play an important role in these respects. As far as
higher education is concerned, emphasis should be
put on the transfer of management and marketing
know-how. Finally, external assistance may help to
stop the brain drain in many developing countries
by supporting improved local research facilities,
e.g. in the area of technologies for processing of
commodities.
For details and practical examples, see World Bank (1992; 1994b)
as well as Borner, Brunetti and Weder (1993).
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4 A BOTTOM-UP APPROACH TOWARDS
PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT: A
PROMISING ALTERNATIVE?
The NGOs' contribution to a stronger software
orientation of aid policies may well spread beyond
more conventional activities in education, training
and health care. Some development economists
have indeed pinned their faith on NGOs in order to
initiate participatory processes from the grassroots
level and, thereby, 'building new constituencies for
state reform' (Borner, Brunetti and Weder 1993:
208). Such a bottom-up approach is believed to
provide a way out of some of the inherent flaws of
the top-down approach applied by Western gov-
ernments and international aid agencies, notably
the World Bank.
The activities of official donors, as far as they relate
to the agenda on participation and governance,
have largely been confined to technical assistance
and training programmes for improving public
administration and legal systems.5 Evidently, such
projects fall short of the comprehensive reform
agenda outlined above. The reluctance, for exam-
ple, of the World Bank to enter into politically
more sensitive issues related to popular participa-
tion may at least partly be attributed to statutory
limitations. Furthermore, the well-known problem
of intruding into the sovereignty of developingcourt
tries is further complicated when conditionality is
extended to socio-political reform requirements.
NGOs may be less constrained in terms of their
legal mandate and political considerations. Hence,
they may be better prepared to engage in the mobi-
lization and organization of marginalized groups
and to help establishing new instruments and chan-
nels through which these groups can strengthen
their participation in the economic and political
sphere. This is what Borner, Brunetti and Weder
(1993) have called entitlement and empowerment
of marginalized groups:
The former aims at participation through better
access to the formal economic system. Entitlement
comprises: endowing marginalized groups with
property rights, e.g. legal titles for land and houses;
granting them access to credit; enabling them to
appropriate the returns of their investment; offer-
ing them access to the legal system; and reducing
bureaucratic hurdles in formalizing their business.
The latter aims at improving participation in
the political system. Empowerment may start with
organizing neighbourhood groups in the informal
sector. Intermediary institutions maythen provide
the link through which political articulation at the
grassroots level affects public decision making at
the local, provincial and state level.
The proponents of the bottom-up approach argue
that the organization of popular pressure and par-
ticipation from below is a necessary prerequisite for
political change and economic progress. They are
extremely sceptical about the political system's
ability and willingness to truly reform itself. Under
such conditions, the effectiveness of the top-down
approach may suffer indeed, as official donors
have to work mainly through the governments of
recipient countries. At the same time, however, the
bottom-up approach is bound to fail under such
conditions.
The potential of NGOs to foster participatory devel-
opments beyond the grassroots level is fairly
small. The activities of various NGOs are typically
focused on specific projects, coordination among
NGOs pursuing different aims is rather weak, and
spillovers beyond narrowly defined target groups
are uncertain at best. In any case, empowerment
from below is an extremely time-consuming pro-
cess. Most importantly, though, it is rather naive to
assume that participatory developments at the
grassroots level can be promoted to any significant
extent in developing countries whose governments
are notoriously unwilling to reform the political
and economic systems. If governments are not re-
form-minded, they will suppress participatory de-
velopments wherever they emerge as soon as such
developments threaten to undermine the power
base of the ruling elites. The experience of NGOs in
various countries provides ample evidence to this
effect. As concerns entitlement as defined above,
the bottom-up approach obviously relies on sup-
portive measures by government authorities. The
definition, protection and enforcement of property
rights is one of the core activities which govern-
ments have to perform. Likewise, better access of
marginalized groups to the formal economic and
legal system requires a change in political and
bureaucratic attitudes by definition. Hence, the
bottom-up approach does not provide an alterna-
tive to top-down attempts at greater participation
and better governance. Rather, both approaches
may supplement each other in countries revealing
at least a minimum of domestic reform-mindedness.
5 CONCLUSION
The ongoing discussion on participatory develop-
ment and good governance arose from growing
concerns about the effectiveness of conventional
development cooperation. Externally financed pro-
grammes and projects often failed to deliver the
expected results. Economic recommendations fell
on institutionally barren ground, and their imple-
mentation suffered from internal bottlenecks in
terms of governance. Past failures have motivated
donors to consider broader concepts of develop-
ment cooperation. Participation and governance
are emphasized as a means to improve the de-
veloping countries' capabilities in coherent policy
formulation and implementation and, thereby,
achieve sustained economic growth and social
development.
The desirability of greater participation and better
governance is beyond serious doubt. However, the
extended agenda on development cooperation will
achieve little to this effect unless traditional dilem-
mas of external aid are taken into account. The
review of the recent DAC orientations reveals that
the donors' credibility is still at jeopardy. In order
to be credible, donor principles for granting or
suspending aid must not be compromised once
export interests are at stake. At the same time,
donors should be aware that conditionality is un-
likely to achieve better results than in the past, if
it is extended to socio-political conditions. Experi-
ence strongly suggests that external aid cannot
turn the tide unless the recipients are ready to tackle
the fundamental bottlenecks hampering economic,
social and political development in their own realm.
Hence, the focus of aid should be on supporting
local efforts at economic and political reform. The
incentives for recipient governments to initiate
such reforms would increase if donors were cred-
ibly committed to help stabilizing the economic and
social situation of reforming countries during the
difficult transition period.
See following page for References.
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